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Book Reviews
Constitutionalism and the Limits of
Character
Daniel Farber, Lincoln's Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003. Pp. 256. $27.50.
David W. Blight*
At a moment in our history when thoughtful people in both blue and red
states consider it a crisis that a deeply conservative President of the United
States, buttressed by a small majority triumph at the polls, may have the
opportunity to appoint three or four new justices to the Supreme Court and
dozens more to the lower federal courts, a close examination of Abraham
Lincoln's constitutional views during the Civil War is timely. Daniel
Farber, a professor of law at the Universities of Minnesota and California
at Berkeley, claims such timeliness because, he writes, "we can use
* Class of '54 Professor of American History, and Director, the Gilder Lehrman Center for the
Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition at Yale. Professor Blight is the author of, among other
books, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory.
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Lincoln as a test of modern constitutional doctrine, and use modem
doctrine as a medium for assessing Lincoln's actions." Farber is very
much interested in placing legal analysis in historical context, but he is
equally concerned with the present. His questions and assumptions,
indeed his very motivation in examining Lincoln's constitutional
performance, stem from concern about the current revival of state rights
doctrine on the Supreme Court. "Secession is dead," declares Farber, "but
not the dispute over state sovereignty." '2
In this insightful and well-crafted mixture of past and present, we get
not only a careful look at Lincoln's legal actions in the ultimate national
test, but also a sustained argument that we are in danger of a true take-over
by latter day proponents of a brand of federalism that would return as
much power as possible to the states. The real target of this work of legal
scholarship is the state rights coalition on the Supreme Court, led, in
Farber's view, by Clarence Thomas. Thomas, according to Farber,
represents a constitutional interpretation not far distant from John C.
Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. Absent slavery and any hint of racial
equality, Farber sees little difference between Thomas-or, fact that
matter, his mentor, Antonin Scalia-and the Old South's principal
intellectual and political leaders.
Writing for the four-judge dissent in the Term Limits case of 1995,
Thomas argued that the majority misunderstood the "reserved powers"
clause in the Tenth Amendment. His most basic "first principle," said
Thomas, was that the "ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." 3 Had a constitutional-
intellectual ancestor of Clarence Thomas been President of the United
States in 1861, the Confederacy and its treasured slave society would
likely have won its national independence. Moreover, the desegregation
measures of the Supreme Court, beginning with Brown in 1954, would
never have occurred in Thomas's constitutional universe. And how could
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been enacted over the "consent" of
states that likely would have vehemently opposed it? In 1964, when
President Lyndon Johnson warned that by standing for federal civil rights
legislation as they did, Democrats might be, in effect, playing defense for
the coming decades, he could not have imagined that among their
staunchest foes would be an African American son of sharecroppers on the
Supreme Court who seemingly owes his career to that very enactment.
But irony has always been one of the best weapons we have in
1. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 2 (2003).
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understanding American history, and it may ever be thus.
Farber is a careful and measured thinker, and he does seem to have a
healthy sense of irony. Unlike the "originalists" among constitutional
scholars, who come under scorn from Farber, this author does not expect a
principle such as "rule of law" to have a crystal clear definition, nor the
question of sovereignty's ultimate "location" to have a simple answer. No
idea stays the same through time in Farber's world view. To conservative
constitutional purists employing rigid "first principles," Farber seems to
say: do some good history first! As a historian of the Civil War era, a time
of great trauma and revolutionary change, I can only say, "Bravo!"
In the early republic and antebellum eras, the biggest constitutional
challenge was the matter of federal supremacy. The extent of federal
power, contends Farber, not an abstract debate over the nature and
location of "sovereignty," was the great question of the day. And he
seems very worried that the great question of our own day may soon be
whether a growing number of justices on the Court, currently four, led by
Thomas, will continue to embrace essentially a version of Calhoun's idea
that the United States is not a real "nation" at all, but a "compact" of states
free to endorse local control over abortion rights, the definition of
marriage, the character of civil rights, and the place of religion in public
life. Farber, of course, could not know our political condition in the wake
of the 2004 election when he wrote his book in 2003, but as he delves into
Lincoln's legal challenges, his demand for a conscious mingling of past
and present is worth our attention especially now that it seems likely that
several more justices of Thomas's stripe will be appointed to the Court.
When Farber wears his historian's hat he is generally a good guide
through the thickets of Constitutional law and thought in the Civil War
period. He will leave some readers a little puzzled over whether he sees
federalism or the expansion of slavery as the deepest cause of the war. He
should move back the "positive good" defense of slavery from the 1850s
to much earlier - the 1820s and 1830s. He might want to reconsider his
embrace of the clich6 that "history is written by the victors" (ex-
Confederates showed us otherwise by the late nineteenth century). And it
is not altogether clear how Farber can square Lincoln's acknowledgement
of the "right of revolution" 4 with his declaration that the "central idea of
secession is the essence of anarchy." 5 Yet Farber is solid on most matters
of context: President James Buchanan's "impotent" view that secession
was wrong but the federal government powerless to stop it; southern
secession as deeply rooted in the defense of slavery; the Merryman case,
the suspension of habeas corpus, and Lincoln's defiance of Chief Justice
4. Id. at 102.
5. Id. at 106.
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Roger Taney; the Clement Vallandingliam free speech case and Lincoln's
"blunder" in arresting this Confederate sympathizer who was ultimately
banished to Canada because a prosecution was untenable; and the general
chaos of the opening months of the war, as well as the tremendous
changes in conceptions of executive authority during a war of
unprecedented scale.
Farber is concerned primarily with three of Lincoln's constitutional
choices: the position that secession was illegal and the decision to use
"coercion" against the seceded states; the emancipation of the slaves by
executive order and as a war measure; and the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in order to suppress disloyalty. Farber acknowledges that
secession does have a logical basis - a government could become so
repressive that a state, or some other group, might seek withdrawal from
the nation as an act of "revolution." But Farber also strongly supports
Lincoln's actions in defending the Union by arms. In his view, 1861 was
not 1776. The American malcontents of 1776 struck for their own
"inalienable human rights" with only a "reluctant" connection to slavery,
argues Farber, whereas the rebels of 1861 (as states) "invoked their
inalienable human rights in defense of their very ownership of slaves." 6
By this reasoning, Farber seems to conclude that secession as the right of
revolution depends on the legitimacy of the cause. For any exercise of
state rights, whether read as hair-splitting or as close constitutional
analysis, one ought to remember that its significance rests in the cause or
purpose for which it is employed.
Farber believes Lincoln had ample legal authority to wage war to
suppress secession and the Confederacy, and he appeals to Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison for support. Indeed, Madison may be
Farber's real hero on all matters constitutional, especially for his staunch
opposition to any form of secession. He places Lincoln's use of force on
the "solid ground" of Madison's Federalist 41, where the Virginian argued
that it would be folly to "oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of
[the nation's] self-preservation." 7  And Hamilton rescues Lincoln in
Federalist 23 by declaring that once the existence of the government is
threatened, "there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide
for the defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to
its efficacy .. ."8 One cannot escape the sobering realization, however,
that the ultimate answer to the question of which idea would prevail in
America - "secession on demand" or "perpetual union at all costs" - came
only in blood.9
6. Id. at 105.
7. Id. at 136.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 110.
[Vol. 17:285
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As a legal war measure, Farber interprets Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation of January 1, 1863, as "clearly justified."' 10 Farber seems a
good deal less interested in this great enactment than in questions of free
speech and individual rights. Emancipation was a seizure of property in
time of war and an "extraordinary use of executive power.""I Farber
views Lincoln and emancipation through the lens of recent scholarship-
an interpretation of the president as a pragmatic thinker who grew with
events and time to see freeing the slaves as both a practical and a moral
necessity for winning the war. But, unfortunately, as a constitutional
problem it just does not garner the same attention in Farber's mind as
those measures for which some have accused Lincoln of "dictatorship."
Farber contends that accusations of Lincoln as a "dictator" are
"overblown." Lincoln, he believes, was a "democratic leader," but one
who "often operated without explicit legal sanction." 12 In the opening
months of the war, under the emergency of putting down a "domestic
insurrection," Lincoln did expand the army enormously, authorized
extraordinary expenditures, closed the mails to some disloyal publications,
ordered a naval blockade of southern ports, and suspended the writ of
habeas corpus in order to control dissent, all initially without
congressional approval. Many of these actions, Farber suggests, were
"akin to lawmaking."' 3 After an extended discussion of the relative
"confusion" during the first eighty years of American constitutional
discourse about the precise limits of executive power, Farber defends
Lincoln on all counts save one-violation of individual rights to free
speech and the extent of military arrests and trials for dissent. Lincoln's
closing of the New York World, a Democratic Party newspaper, and the
small minority of the 13,000 people arrested for disloyal speech who were
northern, non-combatants (jailed for their opinions), says Farber, "cannot
be defended."' 14
In the end, though, Farber asks for careful attention to context, and
he seems to support the open-ended notion that sometimes presidents are
justified in violating some laws in the interest of "necessity." Some parts
of Farber's conclusion fall into lame language. Lincoln's "mixed record"
on civil liberties, he contends, is "perhaps understandable" and "not at all
bad."' 15 One comes to expect more directness from a scholar who has
offered such careful analysis of constitutional language and spirit.
Moreover, Farber identifies two "lessons" from Lincoln's encounter with
10. Id. at 156.
11. Id. at 152.
12. Id. at 115.
13. Id. at 120.
14. Id. at 174.
15. Id. at 175.
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the Constitution in the Civil War. First, that all such analysis must be
placed firmly in history--the "struggles of their times." 16 And second, in
all such great constitutional crises, we must ultimately rely on the
"indispensable role of character" among our leaders. Character? Farber
resolves that in Lincoln's "ability to combine ruthless pragmatism and a
deep fidelity to principle, he may have been unique." 17 Well, if Lincoln
was unique, and we have come to generally trust him in retrospect, how
then do we hope for other presidents, who are likely never to measure up
to the sad-faced genius from Illinois?
Is Farber's scholarly judgment in the end based on trust in
character? This is a sobering prospect in the context of our own time.
With intelligence, learning, and a deep sense of history, Lincoln could
hold two profound ideas in his head at once, and it probably sustained him
through his unprecedented challenge. He was the one who, while young
in 1838, famously said "let reverence for the laws... be the political
religion of the nation." Yet, in the darkest times of the Civil War twenty-
five years later he could declare "liberty to all" and a "new birth of
freedom" his highest principles, thus declaring the Declaration of
Independence, in effect, a greater guide than the Constitution itself. The
rule of law and natural rights-two timeless traditions-march together in
America. We need more than character to find or keep their balance.
16. Id. at 196.
17. Id. at 199.
[Vol. 17:285
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An Anthropologist Examines the Lawyer Tribe
Laura Nader, The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002. Pp. 262. $40.
Edgar S. Cahn*
As a law professor, it feels a bit strange to think of the legal profession
as a tribe to be studied by anthropologists. But for Laura Nader, professor
of anthropology at UC Berkeley, we lawyers have become the tribe whose
rituals, artifacts, craft and rules she has seen fit to study for over four
decades. In The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects, Nader pays
tribute to the achievements of our legal system, but she pulls no punches
when she sees law used as a means for cultural imperialism, maintenance
of exploitive power structures, and the continued subversion of justice.
One cannot avoid noting the centrality of the "justice motive" in
Nader's understanding of the life of the law. Like her brother Ralph, Laura
Nader is at heart an advocate for social justice. It is with an advocate's
soul, therefore, that she speaks to this quiddity of the law - its double-
edgedness as its essence. One edge secures the order of the status quo.
The other destabilizes that order in the search for justice. As an advocate,
Nader fastens onto the hope that justice will at least be served by the law,
while acknowledging the threat that the law concurrently poses to any
such hope.
The Life of the Law began its own life as a series of lectures, and as a
book it has not completely outgrown its origins. Thus the book is best
approached as a kind of travel log, the narrative of a professional
observer's journey into the law told from three perspectives. First, an
intensely personal and experiential view of the law is presented from
Nader's experience as an anthropologist whose fieldwork began with the
Zapotec-speaking people of Mexico and then led to the law tribe of the
United States. Second is an historical chronology of anthropological and
Distinguished Emeritus Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law.
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jurisprudential scholarship on the meaning and life of Anglo-American
law and its relationship to other systems of law, especially those of
colonized peoples. Third comes a synthesizing narrative that seeks to sift
through all that has been learned on Nader's own journey and the journeys
of others into the law's realms in this and other societies.
Through each of these perspectives three separate but interlocking
motifs are introduced and revisited, examined and re-examined in ways
that allow for a deepening understanding of the possibilities and tensions
inherent in Anglo-American law. The first of these motifs: an inquiry into
the nature of law from which emerges a "user theory" of law. The second:
a fierce challenge to the increasingly predominant "harmony model" of
law. The third: a designation of plaintiffs as jurisprudential heroes. I shall
first examine these motifs, and then turn to Nader's decades-long journey
into the law and the three different perspectives upon that journey through
which these motifs weave.
The first motif takes the form of a question: What is law? Does the law
consist only of rules? Or is it rather made up of the whole balance of
norms, exchange relationships and society's ordering processes? The
inquiry begins with her anthropological studies of the Zapotec peoples and
their means of resolving disputes, then continues to the contemporary
American arena. Throughout, the inquiry centers on disputes and on those
who use the dispute-resolving mechanisms in their society. Out of that
inquiry there evolves what she calls a User Theory of Law. "[T]he
direction of law," she observes, "depends mainly on what people are
enabled and motivated to use the law to do. . . .Law clearly comprises
more than judicial or legislative institutions; it also includes the social and
cultural organization of law."1  This provides her vantage point.
Anthropological methods enable her to ask in unique ways "how well the
law fits the society it purports to serve and how able the law is to meet
new contingencies in that society." 2
Armed with anthropological methods of inquiry, Nader pierces the
pervasive belief that Anglo-American law stands apart from the political
rough and tumble of competing interests, providing a level playing ground
in which combatants submit to the neutral application of disembodied
rules. Rather, like all systems of law, it is "the vehicle by which different
parties attempt to gain and maintain control and legitimation of a given
social unit."'3 Yet, it is not only that. Anglo-American law, she notes, is
rooted in conflict. But in relation to justice, the law that emerges from the
1. LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 49 (2002).
2. Id. at 100.
3. Id. at 117.
[Vol. 17:291
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conflict between groups is powerfully double-edged. On the one hand, the
law as the servant of interests serves as a threat to justice. On the other,
the law as a repository of societal norms and principles serves as its
guarantor.
Using her anthropological background, Nader underscores this double-
sided nature of Anglo-American law with an example from her studies in
the Zapotec-speaking part of Mexico. Dispute resolution systems that
may have been introduced as part of the hegemonic system of European
control, she notes, have been altered by the Zapotec-speaking peoples
themselves. The systems she studied had evolved into a counter-
hegemonic system, she noted, one "that services to solidify social
integration at the local level and to erect a legal defense system against
encroachment of superordinate control in the form of the state." 4
The danger posed by law to justice is undeniable. Nader is clear on this.
But by virtue of her discipline and by what that discipline has made it
possible to see, Nader is unable to join the company of those Critical
Legal Studies scholars who view the law only as a system of cultural
hegemony. To such a unitary view of the law - the law as the tool for the
preservation of existing power relations - she cannot subscribe. Her
anthropological perspective commits her to a second and parallel
understanding of the law as a tool for, not against, justice. In
characterizing academic movements in law, she identifies most closely
with the Law and Society movement, believing that law can and must be
used to achieve social change and to remedy inequality and injustice, both
within nation-states and between them. Moreover, it is in the conflictual
nature of the law that its potential for achieving justice lies.
This leads then to the second motif that will thread through Nader's
journey into the law: a blistering critique of the legal profession's shift
since the civil rights era of the 1960s to mediation, alternative dispute
resolution, and what Nader more generally characterizes as the "harmony
model" of law. She traces the rise of mediation and alternative dispute
resolution methods as practiced here in the United States and increasingly
as exported to less-developed, formerly colonized nations. The ideology
of mediation, she notes, "depends upon a negative evaluation of a
traditional legal system, an evaluation that does not pursue root causes."
Disputants are trained
to associate litigation with alienation, hostility, and high cost and to
look upon mediation as a process that 'encourages' civic and
community responsibility for dispute resolution .... [D]isputes about
facts and legal rights become disputes about feelings and
relationships. A therapeutic model replaces the legal one and justice
4. Id. at 36.
Cahn
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is measured by implicit standards of conformity. Social justice as
generally understood ... then becomes irrelevant. 5
Mediation methods are becoming dominant - alarmingly so in Nader's
view. She argues that they are in fact profoundly anti-law, not least in the
ways in which they stack up on the side of control, not justice. She notes
how harmony has been invoked as an ideal by hegemonies as "a means of
pacification through law."6 Citing the American Revolution, she regards
conflict as part of "the struggle in life that keeps people bound together"
and notes that "disputing may be a means to harmony and to autonomy
and self-determination." 7
Justice, or to be more precise, the "justice motive," is what underlies the
third theme that Nader presents. In all societies and among all peoples,
Nader suggests, there exists an inherent sense of what is unjust. Out of
this sense there exists everywhere an ultimately ineradicable "justice
motive" that is the bedrock of all systems of law, not just the Anglo-
American one. It is just this "justice motive" that for her confers
immeasurable superiority on the traditional model of Anglo-American law
over the increasingly dominant methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and mediation. The former, with its roots in social conflict, is a system of
law that is admittedly flawed and internally riddled with tensions, but it is
nevertheless vastly preferable to the bloodless and therapeutizing
"harmony model" that seeks to drive out conflict. Removing conflict from
the law's scope of action also means driving out its capacity to reflect the
just claims of society's weaker members. It also undermines the law's
capacity for meeting a society's changing needs.
This then leads to the culminating theme of the book: the heroic place of
legal plaintiffs in the Anglo-American system of law. It is they, Nader
argues, who ensure that conflict continues to be incorporated into the law.
It is they who ensure that the "justice motive" is served. It is they who
make it possible for the law to adapt and change as it must if it is to
address the needs of a changing society. The life of the law, in Nader's
view, is the plaintiff. "By contesting their injustices by means of law or
illegality or subversions, plaintiffs and their lawyers can decide the place
of law in making history." 8
Those, then, are the three motifs that in different ways are addressed and
revisited through each of the three separate perspectives that Nader takes
in what is a very personal account of a journey into the life of the law.
Let us now look more closely at the terrain that Nader's journey covers
5. Id. at 144.
6. Id. at 29.
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and the three perspectives through which that journey is presented. Nader
speaks first of her experience as an anthropologist. She describes doing
fieldwork in the villages of Mexico, where she came to the conclusion that
a harmony model of law as applied to the Zapotec-speaking population
"was part of a pacification movement that originated with Christian
missionaries and colonizers."9 Nader conducted further fieldwork in the
villages of Lebanon, and then went to the village of Berkeley, California,
in the 1960s. Her field work culminated with an invitation to attend a
different kind of tribal gathering, the annual meetings of the American Bar
Association. She relates the convening of a conference by Chief Justice
Warren Burger to introduce and "sell" Alternative Dispute Resolution to
the legal community. It was then that she observed for the first time that
"the framework of what I call coercive harmony began to take hold."' 0
Parallels, she noted, were drawn "between lawsuits and war, between
arbitration and peace, parallels that invoked danger and suggested that
litigation is not healthy."' l Nader saw that with her observations she had
come in a sense full circle from her original Zapotec research. Now, she
writes, "I was observing another pacification movement that used the
same tactics of 'coercive harmony." ' 12 Nader raises the alarm and builds
what she calls a "user theory" of law whose central argument is that
litigation that plaintiffs pursue is central to ensuring that the law is
dynamic, oriented to social justice, and hence responsive to society's
needs.
Nader's second narrative - her second "take" upon the life of the law -
is a jurisprudential history in which observers of the law in action debate
about what the law is and what it ought to be. The history is of a battle
between elitists and democrats. The former tend to be formalists who
view the law as being crafted by society's finest legal minds, whereas the
latter view the law as growing out the actions and tactics of those who use
it. Clearly, Nader's "user theory" of law aligns far more naturally with the
second position than the first.
The historical presentation begins with the debate between Sir Henry
Maine and an American, Lewis Henry Morgan in the nineteenth century
on the nature of Anglo-American law. For Maine, the legal system was a
triumph of civilization, the result of continuous refinement by generation
after generation of intellectual aristocrats. For Morgan, jurisprudence was
at its finest when it drew upon the wisdom of "the people." Morgan
himself drew upon the wisdom of the Iroquois confederacy and the
restorative justice traditions of the Native Americans whom Maine
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 52.
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dismissed as ignorant primitives.
From there, the historical review jumps to the writing of The Cheyenne
Way in which the legal scholar Karl Llewellyn teamed up with
anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel to analyze how the Cheyenne resolved
the "trouble-cases." Although the book is generally regarded as a classic,
Nader provides us with what may have been its real contemporary
significance-something that has been lost over the years. When
published, the law-making practices of the Cheyenne were laid out as a
challenge to the formalistic assumptions about law being asserted by
professors at the Harvard Law School, especially Dean Langdell. Like Sir
Henry Maine's, this was an elitist approach presenting the law as arising
out of the elaboration of morally neutral and objective doctrinal analysis
by highly trained legal minds on a case-by-case basis. Llewellyn and
Hoebel wrote The Cheyenne Way to illuminate the life of the law, not as
the outcome of an elite discourse, but as the result of community conflicts,
and evolving constantly as a living tool for coping with changing
circumstances.
The battle between elitist and democratic understandings of the law is
then brought up to date with a description of differing "schools" of
jurisprudence. The old battle between elitists and democrats continues,
but has shifted. Standing on the side of the elitists is the harmony model
of law, which discounts real conflicts of interest between colonizers and
the colonized. In particular, "the view that is still with us today, of
colonized peoples as primitive and disordered and in need of being
transformed by plans that are fixed, abstracted, and disembodied, is part of
the culture of expanding capitalist economies with which such
transformation is more compatible."' 3
By the time of the presentation of the third perspective on the life of the
law, Nader's themes have become familiar. Essentially, this becomes a
demonstration of the multiple ways in which plaintiffs have by their
victories caused the law to adapt to the society's changing structure and
needs. For the common good, Nader asserts, the "harmony model" of law
needs to be pushed aside, not promoted. To chart new directions in the law
will require "the courage to enable citizen plaintiffs to reclaim the law." 14
What the law needs is litigation, not harmony.
Thus, in the end, the plaintiff is key for Nader. And just as Nader
herself has come full circle, so has the reader of this rich and intriguing
volume. Yet, while Nader's advocacy for a plaintiff-centered "user-
defined" law is compelling, that advocacy may have produced an over-
reliance on its potency as a corrective force.
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In embracing and celebrating the potency of plaintiffs in major cases
involving the tobacco litigation, toxic waste, and product safety, she tends
to overlook, at least for a moment, one key ingredient that her earlier
observations and her extensive studies in Little Injustices and No Access to
Law: Alternatives to the American Judicial System, brought home. No one
knows better than she (except possibly her brother) how the rich and
powerful use the law. Her own user theory of law asserts that the law is
rarely neutral. The tribe of lawyers, especially when it embraces
Alternative Dispute Resolution, is not a champion of neutrality (as Nader
herself so persuasively argues!). For now at least, lawyers' individual
interests appear overwhelmingly to ride far more with large and powerful
corporations than with the common man. If the law is, as Nader herself
asserts, a vehicle in the struggle for control and legitimation, then the
current dominance of the harmony model may well be as much the
outcome of structural forces as of ideological arguments.
In other words, the harmony model is interior to the legal system, not
something exterior to it. It has arisen from the ways in which lawyers,
judges and plaintiffs (corporate or otherwise) interact, and has not been
imposed upon it. Hence, while the normative arguments push in one
direction, the law itself pushes in another.
In short, we will need more than armies of plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
lawyers to level the playing field and to ensure that the legal system in all
its manifestations is an effective vehicle for realization of what Laura
Nader calls "the justice instinct." The next step will be to take the "user
theory" of justice to another level and create forums and mechanisms
whereby the consumers of unjust practices can become the co-producers
of justice for themselves and for others.
The Life of the Law is an important and complex book-not easy
reading for those unfamiliar with the juristic-anthropological
methodologies in which Nader has been steeped for so many years.
Crossing and crisscrossing her methodological terrain with the familiarity
of long acquaintance, she proffers few signals and signs to orient those
who are less familiar with the field who wish to join her in this exploration
of the law's inner life. The journey is also, however, an immensely rich
one, not least for its portrayal of the inner tensions of the Anglo-American
system of law: those natural contradictions that arise out of the law as it
serves on the one hand to achieve social justice and on the other to secure
social order. While highlighting the law's ever-present proclivity to be
subverted into a vehicle for subjugation rather than a force for justice,
Nader wades in as advocate for the law in its capacity and potential for
ensuring that justice may be served.
Now more than ever, we have need of Nader's refusal to take a one-
sided view of the law. She presents a rare anthropological perspective to
Cahn
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guide us in our quest for ways to create a new culture of civic
responsibility, of outrage against unacceptable disparities, of awareness
that there are disparities-national and international-that must be
deemed so unacceptable that they trigger the intervention of law. Her user
theory of law underscores the fact that it is the recipients of injustice and
their allies who will have to become the producers of a different justice
system. The epic struggles to come that will determine the direction of the
law will be fought on issues as diverse as ownership of the genetic code
and the binary code and in forums as diverse as cyberspace and outer
space. Anthropology is not done with this tribe yet.
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